

Bookmark File LEADING MARINES COMMAND AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION ANSWERS Pdf File Free

The Armed Forces Officer Command Military Culture and Mission Command (auftragstaktik) The Chinese High Command Effects-Based Command and Control: An Alternative Organizational Structure for the Joint Force Commander The World Wide Military Command and Control System evolution and effectiveness Command Concepts Journal of the U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Command Command Adopting Mission Command The Soviet High Command The Art of Command Command Culture The Air Force and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, 1961-1965 The World Wide Military Command and Control System - Evolution and Effectiveness Worldwide Military Command and Control System Military Information Systems The MAC Forum The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command Human Factors Research in Command Information Processing Systems The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-military Relations The Supreme Command Generalship in War 16 Cases of Mission Command Command Decisions Military Review Commanders Digest The Human in Command Actions needed to improve military chain of command and inspectors general grievance procedures Patton The Generals Mission Command in the 21st Century Supreme

Command Military-technological Choices and Political Implications Backgrounder Leadership and Command Crisis in Command World War II German Military Studies: Part III. Command structure Coping with Uncertainty 66 Stories of Battle Command

A New York Times bestseller! An epic history of the decline of American military leadership—from the bestselling author of *Fiasco* and *Churchill and Orwell*. While history has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—it has been less kind to the generals of the wars that followed, such as Koster, Franks, Sanchez, and Petraeus. In *The Generals*, Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In chronicling the widening gulf between performance and accountability among the top brass of the U.S. military, Ricks tells the stories of great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and generals who failed themselves and their soldiers. In Ricks's hands, this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails. This book brings together experienced military leaders and researchers in the human sciences to offer current operational experience and scientific thought on the issue of military command, with the intention of raising awareness of the uniquely human aspects of military command. It includes chapters on the personal experiences of senior commanders, new concepts and treatises on command theory, and empirical

findings from experimental studies in the field. Muth examines the different paths the United States Army and the German Armed Forces traveled to select, educate, and promote their officers in the crucial time before World War II. He demonstrates that the military education system in Germany represented an organized effort where each school provided the stepping stone for the next. But in the US, there existed no communication about teaching contents among the various schools. Experienced commanders discuss anecdotes and case studies from their past operations. Preface -- Abbreviations -- Key figures in the Mayaguez Crisis -- Introduction -- Day one: Monday, May 12 -- Day two: Tuesday, May 13 -- Day three: Wednesday, May 14 -- Day four: Thursday, May 15 -- Critical crisis decisions -- Explaining decisions, behaviors and outcomes -- Refining the explanation: rationality, bureaucracy and beliefs -- Findings, issues, prescriptions -- Conclusion. The recent interest in the operational level of war in American military circles has awakened a long dormant appreciation of the art of planning and conducting campaigns. Unfortunately, there has not been a thorough study of leadership at this level of command. The Army's Senior Leadership manual falls short of adequately discussing operational command. It does not address, for example, the differences between peacetime and combat command or the changing leadership requirements at higher levels of command. These are critically important topics as we prepare to fight the next war. We must be able to identify the right man to execute the first campaigning of that war. Historically we have

been able to do little more than guess at whom what might be. This paper is intended to be a first step toward rectifying that shortfall. It defines the attributes of the operational commander. In order to identify those attributes, this monograph begins with a review of theoretical comments on generalship from early philosophers through the 20th century. Next, modern views on the traits of senior warfighting generals were presented by examining the comments of German, Russian, British and American writers since the beginning of the World War II. In September 2010, James G. Pierce, a retired U.S. Army colonel with the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, published a study on Army organizational culture. Pierce postulated that "the ability of a professional organization to develop future leaders in a manner that perpetuates readiness to cope with future environmental and internal uncertainty depends on organizational culture." He found that today's U.S. Army leadership "may be inadequately prepared to lead the profession toward future success." The need to prepare for future success dovetails with the use of the concepts of mission command. This book offers up a set of recommendations, based on those mission command concepts, for adopting a superior command culture through education and training. Donald E. Vandergriff believes by implementing these recommendations across the Army, that other necessary and long-awaited reforms will take place. *Crisis in Command*, written in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, details the mismanagement of the US

Army's leadership. Former soldiers Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage provide documented evidence that the military forces of the United States are ill-prepared for war, having been weakened by officer-corps members who have abandoned honor and integrity to further their individual careers. What essential leadership lessons do we learn by distilling the actions and ideas of great military commanders such as George Washington, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Colin Powell? *The Art of Command* demonstrates that great leaders become great through a commitment not only to develop vital skills but also to surmount personal shortcomings. In the second edition of this classic resource, Harry S. Laver, Jeffrey J. Matthews, and the other contributing authors identify eleven core characteristics of highly effective leaders, such as integrity, determination, vision, and charisma, and eleven significant figures in American military history who embody those qualities. Featuring new chapters on transitional leadership, innovative leadership, and authentic leadership, this insightful book offers valuable perspectives on the art of military command in American history. *The Air Force and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, 1961-1965*, is a companion volume to Arthur K. Marmor's *USAF Command and Control Problems, 1958-1961*. It seeks to trace major developments in the continuing effort to provide the nation's leaders with command and control facilities for assessing and responding to crises which require, or might require, commitment of America's military forces. Since decisions on most of these developments are made

by the President or the Office of the Secretary of Defense it is frequently difficult to pinpoint the Air Force role in them. They remain very much a part of Air Force history, however. The Air Force contributes many of its most highly skilled officers to the joint agencies that build, operate, and support elements of the worldwide military command and control system. Air Staff officers serve on the joint planning groups that conceive the facilities. And nearly every Air Staff section furnishes support to these planning groups. The report describes the scope, rationale, organization, and progress of a command systems research program to provide human factors information needed for performance within complex automated information processing systems. Following a survey of military information processing equipment and operations and future plans for command information processing systems, basic human factors problems were identified and organized around five critical operations--screening incoming data, transforming raw data for input into storage devices, input, assimilation of displayed information, and decision making. A research program was formulated and studies undertaken to yield empirical information about the effects on human performance of (1) characteristics of the information presented (density, amount, etc.); (2) dynamic aspects of information (type, extent, coding of updates); (3) display modes and sensory modalities (group vs individual displays, multisensory displays); and (4) computer aids to the decision process. A Command Systems Laboratory was developed to permit simulation of various TOS

functions. Findings have suggested the possibility of reduction in storage capacity requirements, number of displays called from storage during a given operational time period, and time required for the total information assimilation-decision process and supported the incorporation and use of information conspicuity coding capabilities in command systems. For the US Army to succeed in the 21st Century, Soldiers of all ranks must understand and use Mission Command. Mission Command empowers leaders at all levels, allowing them to synchronize all warfighting functions and information systems to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative against a range of adversaries. This collection of historical vignettes seeks to sharpen our understanding of Mission Command philosophy and practice by providing examples from the past in which Mission Command principles played a decisive role. Some vignettes show junior officers following their commander's intent and exercising disciplined initiative in very chaotic combat operations. Others recount how field grade officers built cohesive teams that relied on mutual trust to achieve key operational objectives. Each historical account is complemented by an annotated explanation of how the six Mission Command principles shaped the action. For this reason, the collection is ideal for leader development in the Army school system as well as for unit and individual professional development. Mission Command places great responsibility on our Soldiers. This book aims to furnish a history of the origins and development of Soviet military leadership, together with a survey of its relations with the

Communist Party and the governmental apparatus, within the chronological limits of the first attempts to organise the Red Army and a military command. The relationship between military leaders and political leaders has always been a complicated one, especially in times of war. When the chips are down, who should run the show -- the politicians or the generals? In *Supreme Command*, Eliot Cohen examines four great democratic war statesmen -- Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion -- to reveal the surprising answer: the politicians. Great statesmen do not turn their wars over to their generals, and then stay out of their way. Great statesmen make better generals of their generals. They question and drive their military men, and at key times they overrule their advice. The generals may think they know how to win, but the statesmen are the ones who see the big picture. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion led four very different kinds of democracy, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable. They came from four very different backgrounds -- backwoods lawyer, dueling French doctor, rogue aristocrat, and impoverished Jewish socialist. Yet they faced similar challenges, not least the possibility that their conduct of the war could bring about their fall from power. Each exhibited mastery of detail and fascination with technology. All four were great learners, who studied war as if it were their own profession, and in many ways mastered it as well as did their generals. All found themselves locked in conflict with military men. All four triumphed. Military men often dismiss politicians as

meddlers, doves, or naifs. Yet military men make mistakes. The art of a great leader is to push his subordinates to achieve great things. The lessons of the book apply not just to President Bush and other world leaders in the war on terrorism, but to anyone who faces extreme adversity at the head of a free organization -- including leaders and managers throughout the corporate world. The lessons of Supreme Command will be immediately apparent to all managers and leaders, as well as students of history. Throughout history, the concept of command -- as both a way to achieve objectives and as an assertion of authority -- has been essential to military action and leadership. But, as Sir Lawrence Freedman shows, it is also deeply political. Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare. This monograph examines the adequacy of the joint task force (JTF) to operate effectively in the context of wartime uncertainty. Military theorists have long understood the

deleterious effects of uncertainty on the conduct of war. Commanders never know as much about the enemy or environmental conditions as they would like, so they decide and act on the best information available, however incomplete. In coping with uncertainty, there are proven methods of structuring one's organization to meliorate its effects. These methods involve decentralizing command, lowering decision thresholds, and creating self-contained, semi-autonomous units. U.S. military doctrine recognizes the need for JTFs in responding to the global commitments of the nation. Unfortunately, Service incompatibilities and parochialism often have hampered the joint commander's ability to get the job done. Congress mandated reform through the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986; the result has been to streamline joint command structures, thus making them better able to deal with uncertainty. The experience of multi-Service operations during World War II confirms the wisdom of creating joint task forces when doctrinal conditions are met. The United States military is in a period of transformation and is consequently conducting significant research, analysis, and experimentation to determine the nature of future warfare and its required joint force capabilities. U.S. Joint Forces Command, the lead military organization tasked with exploring military transformation and experimentation has proposed that joint and combined operations in the 21st century will be characterized by a concept known as Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). As part of the research and analysis of the RDO concept, exploration into the ways in

which the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will need to organize their command and control (C2) architecture to match the future war fighting environment is occurring. Based on initial evidence, it appears that the current C2 architecture and "ad hoc" nature of JFC's headquarters structure will not adequately support the RDO concept. An entirely new approach to organizing the JFC C2 architecture is needed in order to more efficiently and effectively plan and execute an effects-based campaign; thereby fully capitalizing on the speed and agility envisioned RDO. This paper proposes that an Effects-Based Command and Control architecture may be the answer. An Effects-Based Command and Control architecture is primarily based on the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute an effects-based campaign; taking into consideration all elements of national power in order to counter the adversary. This conceptual C2 architecture leverages and incorporates the interrelated concepts of RDO, effects-based campaigning, effects-based operations, the Standing Joint Force headquarters organization, and joint tactical groups/joint tactical actions into one complete C2 structure for the JFC. It may be the standard foot soldier or individual pilot who fights a war but the success or failure of a battle or campaign usually hinges on the quality of the command and leadership at the top. Without efficient strategy and planning, effective decision-making, and determined control by the most senior staff, military action is destined to fail. These skillful essays, from the membership of the British Commission for Military History, brings together

significant examples from the last 140 years in order that other students of the subject are encouraged to compare the various examples of command experienced in that time - from the American Civil Wars and the Victorian Colonial Wars, through 1914-18 and 1939-45, Korea, Vietnam and the Falklands to the Gulf War. This new paperback edition includes a revised and expanded Introduction. The members of the British Commission for Military History contributing to this book include some of Britain's leading military lecturers, commentators and authors. The World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) is constituted of four general types of elements: sensors, command posts, computers, and communications networks. Whereas previous books dealt mainly with the first two types, this book is concerned far more strongly with the second two. The same conditions that cleared the way for the establishment of WWMCCS and that permitted its subsequent growth simultaneously guaranteed that it would not be able to function effectively. We might conclude that WWMCCS was born to fail. This work documents how this interplay of organization, technology, and ideology shaped the development of WWMCCS during the cold war's three final tense decades. David E. Pearson, an Army veteran, graduated magna cum laude from the University of Mass. at Amherst, received his PhD from Yale, and was a Fellow in International Security Studies at Ohio State University. (Originally published by Air University Press) The purpose of the current thesis was to examine the adoption and adaptation process of mission command (Auftragstaktik) in modern

military organizations. This concept denotes a system wherein superiors dictate their intent and allow subordinates to formulate their operational plans independently. The research first examined organizational theory's perspective on this system and then traced its origins in the historic Prussian-German army. Having established a yardstick for comparison, the research investigated the American, British and Israeli armies which have endeavoured to emulate the system. While all three have officially incorporated mission command into doctrine and training, they have been less successful in utilizing it in operational situations. It was found that the gap was due partially to ongoing transformations in military affairs such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the spread of low-intensity conflicts and operations other than war. A comparison between the three case-studies also demonstrated how different military cultures interpret, articulate and exercise mission command. -- The research focused on questions such as: Why was the adoption of mission command more successful in some cases? What variants of mission command have developed in the adaptation process? How does command and control technology impact mission command? What are the cultural factors that create the gap between doctrine and behaviour? What is the impact of mission command on a host culture? Having examined these questions, the thesis illustrated how military cultures affect the adoption of innovative but foreign concepts promising to increase operational capabilities. Based on papers from the first Congress on the

Information System Sciences, November 1962. Værket beskriver kinesisk militærpolitik fra 1927-1971 herunder udviklingen af "Folkets Befrielseshær" (PLA) og dennes betydning og indflydelse på Mao-Kinas politik og samfundsudviklingen herunder "Kulturrevolutionen." In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution. Chronicles the dynamic figures of military history, including leaders from Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar to General George Patton, major battles, and the development of strategy and tactics Examines General George S. Patton's leadership and strategy as a battlefield commander in North Africa and Europe during World War II. The qualities of commanders and their ideas are more important to a general theory of command and control than are the technical and architectural qualities of their computers and communications systems. This theory separates the art of command and control (C2) from the hardware and software systems that support C2. It centers on the idea of a command concept, a commander's vision of a military operation that informs the making of command decisions during that operation. The theory suggests that the essential communications up and down

the chain of command can (and should) be limited to disseminating, verifying, or modifying command concepts. The theory also suggests, as an extreme case, that an ideal command concept is one that is so prescient, sound, and fully conveyed to subordinates that it would allow the commander to leave the battlefield before the battle commences, with no adverse effect upon the out-come. This report advances a theory about military command and control. Then, through six historical case studies of modern battles, it explores the implications of the theory both for the professional development of commanders and for the design and evaluation of command and control architectures. The report should be of interest to members of the Joint Staff and the services involved in developing command and control doctrine for the U.S. military, and to all of those interested in the military art and science of command and control. A description of General Eisenhower's wartime command, focusing on the general, his staff, and his superiors in London and Washington and contrasting Allied and enemy command organizations.

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